

## In The Tradition Of Kantotle: Grice On Making Of Oneself A Free Person

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Abstract: Grice's and Hegel's main philosophical goal is to develop an idea of freedom in such a way that "the most important unsolved problem in philosophy, namely how we can be at one and the same time members both of the phenomenal and of the noumenal world" (Grice, *Action and Events* 35) can be solved or dissolved. The author concentrates in this article on Grice's metaphysical program, because it is less known than Grice's philosophy of language and less known than Hegel's philosophy. First, she reconstructs critically that part of Grice's metaphysical program in which he argues that instances of the biological substance type *Homo sapiens* are equipped with the necessary means to transubstantiate *themselves* thereby generating a new substance-type *Person*. Since this type is no longer conceivable in merely mechanistic or mechanisticumbiological terms, an extension of the conceptual framework is needed comprising also practical concepts ("absolute value", "freedom"). Secondly, she considers the special methodological status of the concept of person in Grice's metaphysics. Here Grice's and Hegel's programs coincide beyond Kant's philosophy, which discloses both as Kantotelians. At the end, the author sketches two important points of the methodological role of the concept of freedom for executing a comprehensive Kantotelian program.

Keywords: Grice, Hegel, Metaphysics, Freedom, Naturalism.

*"Philosophy, like virtue, is entire. Or, one might even dare to say,  
there is only one problem in philosophy, namely all of them."*  
(Grice: Reply to Richards, CoV 64)

*"A definition of the nature and range of metaphysical enquiries  
is among the most formidable philosophical tasks; we need all the  
help we can get, particularly at a time when metaphysicians have only  
recently begun to re-emerge from the closet"*  
(Grice: Aristotle on the multiplicity of being; 176)

Following Kant, Kantotelians hold, (i) that the concept of freedom is the keystone of a system of pure reason in its practical and its theoretical use (AA V 3), that is of philosophy as such (WdL 6/548; Enc. §§575-77); (ii) that under the concept of person fall those entities which are free and can, therefore, play this methodological role of the concept of freedom (ibid.); (iii) that the concept of a free person is

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not a concept of an entity which is just *naturally given*, but rather a concept of an entity which results from an act or process of finite spirits like us (AA V 31, 42, 55; Enc. §539, §576).

Like Aristotle –and, to some extent, unlike Kant– Kantotelians hold that such a concept of a free person needs to be justified by extending the concept of a naturally given entity (*i. e.*, a human being, CoV 72; Enc. §576), and it has to be shown that such a conceptual extension, which transgresses naturalism, is nevertheless naturalistically acceptable. Kantotelians, therefore, need to develop a philosophical methodology that allows (i) to conceive of humans as entities of a natural type, (ii) to enrich this concept, in a rational way, in order to attain the concept of a free person: a concept which differs intensionally, but not extensionally, from the concept of a human being, and (iii) to establish that we are able to perform (i) and (ii) – thereby actualizing our freedom and starting to philosophically comprehend ourselves as free.

In this sense, Hegel certainly is a Kantotelian<sup>2</sup> – he might even be the first one, but he is not the last one. Paul Grice, one of the most prominent analytic philosophers, is a Kantotelian, too (CoV 115). Since both, Grice and Hegel, are devoted to answering basically the same questions, readers interested in the subject “Hegel and the Analytic Tradition” have the rare chance to compare a program originated in the Analytic Tradition with Hegel’s philosophy. Such a comparison is not only instructive for scholars with an interest in the history of philosophy, but should also be stimulating for anyone who takes Hegel seriously as a systematic philosopher. As Sellars once wrote, “a system dies when the questions it seeks to answer are no longer asked; and only where the questions are the same can there be a genuine clash of answers.” (1948, p. 601)

In the following, I shall mainly concentrate on Grice’s metaphysical project, assuming that my reader will be less familiar with it than with Hegel’s. Corresponding passages in Hegel’s philosophy will be specified in brackets; occasionally, I shall use footnotes to indicate special affinities or points of divergence between Hegel and Grice. I have chosen this procedure to help contemporary metaphysicians to work together, independently of their academic affiliation.

In particular, I shall concentrate, first, on that part of Grice’s program in which he argues that instances of the biological substance type *Homo sapiens* are equipped with the necessary means to transubstantiate *themselves* thereby generating a new substance-type *Person*. Since this type is no longer conceivable in merely mechanistic or mechanisticcumbiological<sup>3</sup> terms, an extension of the conceptual framework is needed comprising practical concepts (“absolute value,” “freedom”). Secondly, I consider the special methodological status of the concept of person in Grice’s metaphysics. Here Grice’s and Hegel’s programs coincide beyond Kant’s philosophy, which discloses both as Kantotelians. Since we are then entering the difficult realm of the concept of freedom and its methodological role for executing a comprehensive philosophical program, I can only sketch two important points.

#### I. HUMANS CAN TRANSUBSTANTIATE THEMSELVES INTO PERSONS

<sup>2</sup> See for Hegel’s Aristotelism: 19/132 f., 148f, 158, 160f, 164f.; and for his Kantianism: 20/331, 20/367, 6/254

<sup>3</sup> Henceforth ‘broadly mechanistic framework’. Both Grice and Hegel believe that an introduction of teleological concepts is the first step to overcome a mechanistic framework, that this introduction can be justified in a mechanistic framework and that this is necessary in order to develop a concept of free persons. (WdL 6/437)



Grice's and Hegel's main goal is to develop an idea of freedom in such a way that "the most important unsolved problem in philosophy, namely how we can be at one and the same time members both of the phenomenal and of the noumenal world" (Action and Events (AaE) 35) can be solved or dissolved:

"or, to put the issue less cryptically [and in less Kantian and more Hegelian terms; mw], to settle the internal conflict between one part of our rational nature, the scientific part which calls (or seems to call) for the universal reign of deterministic law, and that other part which insists that not merely moral responsibility but *every* variety of rational belief demands exemption from just such a reign." (ibid.)<sup>4</sup>

The decisive task of Grice's metaphysical program is to develop a comprehensive conception of ourselves that fulfils at least the following two conditions: (i) it cannot be *determined in* a broadly mechanistic conceptual framework (*Person*); but (ii) it can be *reached rationally out of* such a framework (*Homo sapiens*).<sup>5</sup> The decision to take this second demand seriously pushes not only Grice but also Hegel out of Kant's *architectural* framework into a model that is inspired by Aristotle (WdL 5/22, 6/268, 6/490f; Enc. §378). As Grice puts it:

"Such a metaphysical justification of the notion of value [that is, of a free person; mw] might perhaps be comparable to the result of appending, in a suitably integrated way, the *Nicomachean Ethics* as a concluding stage to the *De Anima*." (CoV 72, Enc. §§ 481–486, 19/221)

Although both choose another theory design as Kant the main task remains Kantian (See, AA IV 428). Both aim at a justification of the Kantian claim that persons are of absolute value *because* as "essentially rational beings" they are "necessarily, and perhaps for that reason, free" (CoV 87; Rph §132; Enc. §481).

To get a hold of that Kantian claim Grice differentiates between beings that are only accidentally rational (*humans*) (Enc. §§445–468 and §§469–480) and beings that are essentially rational (*persons*) (Rph §132; Enc. §481). Thereby he shows that accidentally rational beings have the capacity and the motivation to transform themselves into beings that are essentially rational by an act that Grice calls not without some self-irony "metaphysical transubstantiation." If this selftransformation can be justified, Grice has taken at least one important step to solve that "most important unsolved problem in philosophy" because he has not only helped identify the point at which even a broadly mechanistic framework loses explanatory power (CoV 87). He also has shown this *from the perspective* of a broadly mechanistic theory because the starting point of this selftransformation (*humans*) is conceived (I.1.1.) and conceives itself only in such a way (II.1). Precisely because Grice chooses such a mundane basis he is *in a position* to

<sup>4</sup> At the end of his *Science of Logic* Hegel tries to overcome the dualism of our two basic conflicting epistemic attitudes ("Idea of Truth" and "Idea of Good") by integrating some aspects of both into a new epistemic attitude ("absolute Idea") as philosophical attitude. If this is true, for Hegel doing philosophy is nothing else than settling that internal conflict.

<sup>5</sup> I often abbreviate Grice's 'substantial type *Homo sapiens*' with '*Homo sapiens*' and 'substantial type *Person*' with '*Person*', 'instances of the substantial type *Homo sapiens*' with *humans*, and 'instances of the substantial type *Person*' with '*persons*'.

develop “an understanding of the way in which the world (‘phenomenal’) viewed in terms of cause and effect, and the world (‘noumenal’) viewed in terms of reasons, fit together” (CoV 67).

Thus, to assess Grice’s proposal we need to understand, first, what it means that something is accidentally rational; and second, evaluate Grice’s claim that such beings have the capability and motivation to make of themselves essentially rational beings.

#### 1. THE MUNDANE STARTING POINT OF METAPHYSICAL TRANSUBSTANTIATION: *HUMANS*

Grice introduces the concept of substance type *Homo sapiens* as the concluding concept of a “Metaphysics of Biology” (CoV 72; Enc. §376). Here it is enough to record the distinction between inanimate and animate substance types. Instances of inanimate substance types are characterized by passive finality; animate ones by active finality:

(L) Every living being possesses “in virtue of the fact that it is ... a sort of living creature ... as an essential property an active finality” (CoV 81), that is, every living being “is *supposed* to do” (my emphasis; CoV 80) certain things. (Enc. §204)

Grice labels this “active kind of finality property as *métiers* or *roles*” (CoV 80; PhdG 3/189). Since the qualification “is supposed” is crucial, an anticipatory remark is in order. Something that is *supposed* to do x qua member of a certain type of living beings, may fail to do x without ceasing to be a member of that type. For this to be possible the property that is an active finality *cannot* be a defining or constituting property of the type in question, though it might be an essential property. Since Grice generally thinks of finality as “*detached* finality,” i.e., as “purposes which are detached from any [external; mw] purposer” (CoV 79; Enc. §360), we do not need to invoke anybody or anything other than the instances of the type of living being under discussion that is externally positing purposes for them.

If we apply this distinction between inanimate and animate beings to the concept *Homo sapiens*, we can conclude that it is part of the essence of instances of this substance type *to do* certain things, to have a *métiers* or role (CoV 81).

For the concept of *Homo sapiens* to play its role in a metaphysical justification of the concept of *person* whose instances are essentially rational and therefore free, Grice needs, at least, to show (i) that the concept of *Homo sapiens* is still a concept of a *biological type*, i.e., a concept determinable in a broadly mechanistic framework, and (ii) that from a broadly mechanistic framework it can be justified that “rationality attaches non-essentially though predictably” to it (CoV 84; 10/405f.).

### 1.1. THE GENITORIAL PERSPECTIVE

In order to execute the program of a Metaphysics of Biology, Grice suggests that we adopt the heuristic perspective of a “genitor” whose task is to construct “a sequence of types of creatures”<sup>6</sup> (CoV 140). In his constructions the genitor is constrained, at least, by the following rules.<sup>7</sup>

(G1) He is “concerned *only* to optimize survival chances” (CoV 141). This rule determines (1) the sole *end* the constructions of the genitor must satisfy, namely, survival that the genitor does *not* question (it is for him only a *given* end); and (2) the reasoning he has to perform. He only needs to find suitable means for this end. Hence, if there are different kinds of reasoning, the way the genitor reasons can be dubbed “means-end-reasoning.”<sup>8</sup> But since Grice does not conceive of the genitor *as creator*, he does not need to have capacities of practical reason, i.e., to form a will to realize the necessary means to the end of survival.

To find suitable means for optimizing the survival chances of creatures, the conditions in which the creatures have to live must be specified.

(G2) The genitor must “keep a close eye on the actual world in order to stay within the bounds of the possible” (CoV 141). To conform to this rule the genitor must be able to acquire knowledge about the world. .

Furthermore the genitor’s choices of appropriate means must be further constrained if the resulting series should serve as explanation for the actual variety of types of living beings.

(G3) The genitor installs only that *minimum* of capacities which the instances of the new type of living beings “require in order to optimize the chances to perform just those operations” (CoV 141). For example, plants “will not require psychological apparatus in order that their operations should be explicable performed.” (CoV 141; Enc. §343 ff.)

(G3) secures also, though less obviously, that the genitor constructs *different* types of living beings. For without (G3) he could equip every living being with all available capacities. Only in case of internal conflicts among these capacities (which would diminish the survival chances of the living beings equipped with them), the genitor would be forced to choose among them. Furthermore, it connects the

<sup>6</sup> Grice chooses the word ‘creature’. But since this expression refers to a creator, I prefer the term ‘living being’. The fact that the expression ‘creature’ is still common in ordinary and scientific English, may indicate the presence of an old worldview that philosophy, as Hegel understands it, needs to thoroughly scrutinize before it can be used in philosophy. Since Hegel uses *Lebewesen* and not *Geschöpf* or *Kreatur* he probably believed that these latter terms failed the test. Although Grice is presented and presents himself as philosopher of ordinary language, there is textual evidence that he would not have disagreed with Hegel’s operation. He only claims that philosophy must *start* with an analysis of ordinary language. In a second step the philosopher “may well want (and often *should* want) to go on to ask such questions as ‘Why do we use these expressions this way, rather than some other way?’” (SWW 179).

<sup>7</sup> See 8/145 and 20/291 f. for Hegel’s distinction between a naturalistic and a non-naturalistic perspective. Compare also Wildenauer (2004), p. 210, footnote 2 for an example of Hegel’s praise of materialism.

<sup>8</sup> This is probably the reason why Siobhan Chapman claims that Grice “is supporting a means-end account of practical reason” (p. 161). As we will see, for Grice it is crucial that our rationality is *not* confined to the process of finding suitable means to un-questioned, already given ends. On the contrary, using our rationality essentially means that we transcend the realm of means-end reasoning *by* questioning the legitimacy of *every* end (see AoR, p. 110: “practical thinking, which is not just means-end thinking”). Compare for Kant and Hegel: Fulda (2003)

inner capacities with the outwardly manifested operations of every type of living being the genitor constructs. For without (G3) there could be a lot of hidden capacities without outward manifestations (see G5).

(G4) The genitor introduces new types of living beings so that the pre-psychological (i.e. physiological) or “psychological theory for a given type is an extension of, and includes, the psychological theory of its predecessor-type” (CoV 142; Enc. §380). This rule secures that the elements of the resulting set of living beings are ordered as a “developing series” (ibid., Enc. §368).

If the genitor adheres to these four rules, an additional principle is fulfilled.

(G5) Since the function of newly installed capacities is to enable living beings to *operations* conducive to survival, the introduction of new capacities is governed by the rule “inner states must have outward manifestations” (CoV 143; Enc. §401, §411; Rph §118). A determination of psychological concepts needs to invoke (*ceteris paribus*) laws that employ them as well as their outward manifestations essentially (PhdG 3/229).<sup>9</sup>

These five rules are selected to secure that method and concepts used in the genitorial perspective are “amenable” to a naturalist. Grice strategy is, so I believe, successful for such naturalists who are broad-minded enough to include biological concepts into their theories as long as a reduction of biology to physics is not accomplished.

By following these rules, the genitor reaches a position in the developing series of types of living beings in which he must endow “creatures whose biological needs are complex and whose environment is subject to considerable variation” (CoV 83) with a special capacity or capacities for operations to secure survival. In this situation, it is no longer economic for the genitor to “equip the creature with a suitably enormous battery of instincts” (ibid.; Enc. §361). Instead, only the endowment of rationality conforms to the rules that restrict the genitor (especially G3). Therefore the rationale for the introduction of rationality is its “biological utility” (ibid.) for a particular kind of living beings. Since *this idea* (rationality is of some biological utility for us) is not uncommon today, I will not discuss this point any further. More important are Grice’s reasons for the claim that the genitor endows the new substance-type with rationality only *accidentally* (1.2).

A remark on the methodological status of the genitorial perspective is here in order. The introduction and, after completing the Metaphysics of *Homo sapiens*, the elimination of the genitorial perspective *as external perspective* serves Grice to illustrate the contrasts between the following concept pairs. For each first concept an external (genitorial) perspective is sufficient since their objects are elements of the phenomenal world; whereas for each second concept such perspective is not sufficient since their objects are elements of a noumenal world. (i) Entities explainable in a broadly mechanistic framework vs. entities conceivable only in a mechanistic-teleologicalpractical framework; (ii) the concepts of being accidentally vs. essentially rational; (iii) the ability to form hypothetical imperatives to satisfy naturally given desires vs. the ability to form categorical imperatives to justify naturally given ends or generate new, non-naturally given ends; (iv) the concepts of being heteronymous vs. autonomously free.

<sup>9</sup> Michael E. Bratman (2000, p. 252) has neglected this rule in his “Gricean creature construction”, since there is no difference in the “outward manifestations” of his Creature 2 and 3.

## 1.2. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE ACCIDENTALLY RATIONAL?

To understand the point where the heuristic perspective of an *external* genitor can be abandoned, we need to concentrate on the contrasts by means of Grice motivates the step from *Homo sapiens* to *Person*: first, the contrast between being accidentally and essentially rational; second, that between hypothetical and categorical imperatives.

### 1.2.1. ACCIDENTAL VS. ESSENTIAL PROPERTIES

Grice distinguishes between essential properties of a kind and of an instance of a kind. Essential properties of a kind he characterizes as properties that are

- (i) “constitutive” (CoV 80) or “defining properties” (CoV 79) of that kind—without being identical with the necessary properties of that kind (since necessary properties might not be essential (ibid.));
- (ii) properties that are “intimately bound up [but (possibly) not identical; mw] <sup>10</sup> with the identity conditions for entities which belong to that” sort (CoV 79).

Essential properties of an instance of a kind (thing) he characterizes as

- (iii) properties that “that thing cannot loose without ceasing to exist” (CoV 79).

If we apply this characterization to the substances-types under discussion (*Homo sapiens* and *Person*) and their instances (*humans* and *persons*), we get:

- (H1) “being rational” is not a defining or constitutive property of *Homo sapiens*
- (P1) “being rational” is a defining or constitutive property of *Person*
- (H2) “being rational” is not intimately bound up with the identity conditions of *humans*.<sup>11</sup>
- (P2) “being rational” is intimately bound up with—but not (necessarily) identical to—the identity conditions of *persons*.<sup>12</sup>

(h1) a *human* can loose (transiently or permanently) the property of being rational without “ceasing to be identical with itself” (iii) and without ceasing to be a member of *Homo sapiens* (ii).

<sup>10</sup> This qualification is essential since only with it we can think of a living being as human (although not essentially rational). This possibility may secure humans rights to such humans.

<sup>11</sup> This allows one to specify identity conditions that refer, for example, to bodily characteristics of *humans*.

<sup>12</sup> Grice does not specify identity conditions of *persons* that are non-identical with the essential property “being rational” of their substance type *Person*. In his earliest published essay “Personal Identity” (Mind 50 (1941), p. 330-50), not distinguishing yet between *persons* and *humans*, he proposes identity conditions that stand in a Lockean tradition.

(p1) a *person* cannot lose (even transiently<sup>13</sup>) the property of being rational<sup>14</sup> without “ceasing to be identical with itself” (iii) and, therefore, without ceasing to be a member of *Person* (CoV 114f).

If we combine these applications of Grice’s essential and accidental properties of sorts and instances to the two substance types under discussion with G5 (“inner states must have outward manifestations”) and L (every living being and its type has, at least, active finality as one essential property), the following questions arise:

(Q1) What active finality characterizes the substance type *Homo sapiens* or its instances *humans* essentially?

(Q2) What are the outward manifestations of the active finality of *Homo sapiens* respectively *humans*?

(Q3) Which active finality characterizes the substance type *Person* or its instances *persons* essentially? (See II)

(Q4) What are the outward manifestations of the active finality of *Person* respectively *persons*? (See II)

Unfortunately, although these questions arise directly from Grice’s account, it is not easy to find his answers to (Q1) and (Q2). Prima facie, there are two possibilities in the case of *Homo sapiens* or *humans*: 1. *Humans* deliver hypothetical imperatives that can guide their behavior (Q1) so that this forms a special sub-class of operations of living beings, namely *actions* (Q2). 2. *Humans* transubstantiate themselves (Q1), thereby generating a new substance type, namely *Person*, and, at the same time, instances of it (Q2). And since both options depend on the property ‘being *accidentally* rational’, the further difficulty must be carefully addressed that both options need to be developed so as to be compatible with (H1), (H2), and (h1). Thus, in order to remain in a Gricean framework we need to think the following scheme:

(X) Although the property ‘being rational’ is neither a defining or constitutive property of *Homo sapiens* nor intimately bound up with the identity conditions of *humans* nor an essential property of *humans*, ‘being rational’ is, at least, intimately bound up with the active finality of *Homo sapiens* (17/251 ff.).

With this scheme we have reached Grice’s reason for characterizing the property ‘active finality’ so that it does not specify what the corresponding substances *actually* do (acting according to hypothetical imperatives) but what they are *supposed* to do (transubstantiating themselves into persons, who are supposed to act according to categorical imperatives). For that scheme is coherent only if the active finality of *Homo sapiens*, though essential for the substance-type, is not a defining property of *Homo sapiens* or an essential property of *humans*. But first we need to reconstruct the legitimacy of the genitorial introduction of rationality.

<sup>13</sup> This qualification takes into account that Grice claims we are only “in our better moments” (CoV 145) *persons*. That means that our transubstantiation to *persons* does not happen once and for all but only for some time, although it can happen again.

<sup>14</sup> Strictly speaking, *up to this point* in his argument Grice is not committed to the claim that ‘being rational’ is an essential property of *persons*. But if the generation of the new substance type *Person* is done by *humans* in so far as they *take* their rationality *as essential* not only the resulting new substance type (‘Person’) but also the resulting new substances (‘persons’) are essentially rational. In this special case, the essential properties of the type and those of its instances *should* be identical. This is why (ii) does not rule out this case as a borderline case.

### 1.2.2. AS ACCIDENTALLY RATIONAL BEINGS HUMANS CAN DELIVER HYPOTHETICAL IMPERATIVES TO GUIDE ACTION

As we have seen, the attribution of rationality to the new substance type *Homo sapiens* serves the biological utility of survival (G1 and G3). But what special kind of *operations* can humans perform thereby manifesting that capacity so that it furthers the end of survival (G5)? Only if this question is answered convincingly, the genitor's introduction of rationality in the sequence of living beings is legitimate. Grice's answer seems to be that the special kind of operation is *action*, i.e., operations initiated by an intentional willing of suitable means to the overall biologically given end of survival:

"the genitor has designed a creature which is capable of asking questions about the value of ends, and so of enquiring about the possible availability of categorical imperatives over and above the *hypothetical imperatives* which the creature [humans, mw] was initially scheduled to deliver." (my emphasis, CoV 86; Enc. §§ 476-78; Rph §182).

What does it mean to be capable of delivering hypothetical imperatives? How is this capability related to the nonessential capacity of rationality? In *Aspects of Reason* (p. 92 ff) and in his 2<sup>nd</sup> Carus Lecture Grice discusses Kant's distinction between technical (hypothetical), pragmatic (hypothetical), and moral (categorical) imperatives (AA-IV 417). I must confine myself to a short list of some of Grice's theses about hypothetical imperatives:

(H.I.1) Since causal relations between means and ends detectable only by alethic reason enter essentially into acts of reasoning delivering hypothetical imperatives, contributions of alethic reason are necessary to deliver hypothetical imperatives.

(H.I.2) Hypothetical imperatives connect judgments ("A only as a result of B") and willings ("I will A (end)" and "I will B (means)") with each other: "*ceteris paribus*, for any creature x (of a sufficiently developed kind), no matter what A and B are, if x wills A and judges that if A, A only as a result of B, then x wills B" (AoR 94, CoV 134 -138).

(H.I.3) Since the willing of B as a means to end A is only functional to further the biological utility of survival, provided that that willing has, at least, *some* influence on the operations of the creature (CoV 59, 67), the genitor has to secure that influence by installing a causally efficient practical reason into humans.

For (H.I.2) a creature endowed with rationality must have at its disposal some sort of *inferential* rules that connect the contents of alethic reason with the contents of practical reason. But having such a capacity does not imply that the creature "as a matter either of physical or logical necessity ... in fact acts in line with" the result of its considerations (CoV 59).<sup>15</sup> For (G3) and (G4) there are also pre-rational capacities that might interfere, at least occasionally, but are still necessary to secure or enhance the chance

<sup>15</sup> If I understand correctly Grice's reconstruction of Kant's claim "he who wills the end, wills the indispensable means" in *Aspects of Reason* (AoR 94 – 96) he wants to show that already hypothetical imperatives imply an evaluation not only of the acceptability of the indispensable means but also of the end itself. If Grice is able to show this, he has delivered a crucial bridging principle connecting the ability to form hypothetical imperatives with the ability to form categorical imperatives.

of survival even for accidentally rational living beings. Thus, it is an important desiderate for a fully developed philosophy of *Homo sapiens* and its instances “[t]o take *really* seriously a distinction between rational and prerational states and capacities, with unremitting attention to the various relations between the two domains” (CoV 67). Kant has provided a strong rationale for such a theory since only with it can we say whether and how pure practical reason can cause a feeling of respect for the moral law so that this feeling can have motivational power to initiate actions. One of the main goals of Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit is to deliver such a theory. Thus, we get a preversion of Kant’s claim that pure practical reason has causal efficacy. This is only a *preversion* since the given desire to survive still motivates actions guided by hypothetical imperatives. But it is already a *preversion* because the *character* of the performed actions is essentially determined by the preceding rational deliberation. Creatures able to act according to hypothetical imperatives operate *differently than* creatures that operate only on instinct (Rph §190).

To sum up: Rationality has a “biological utility” for living beings with complex natural needs in varying surroundings because by using it alethically they can acquire knowledge about those surroundings. That is a necessary condition to determine suitable means to the biological given end of survival; so that such living beings are able to deliver hypothetical imperatives that can guide their operations. Since using rationality has its costs, sometimes it is better to let the operations be determined and initiated by instincts. Thus, because *humans* only need to use their rationality as a suitable *means* to the naturally given end of survival, the genitor is only justified to endow them with rationality *accidentally*.

### 1.2.3. RELATIVELY UNLIMITED RATIONALITY: BEING ABLE TO ASK QUESTIONS BIOLOGICALLY USEFUL OR NOT.

The genitor’s second important question is whether he is justified to introduce rationality as

“a relatively unlimited, unrestricted capacity, a capacity perhaps for being *concerned* [my emphasis] about and for handling a general range of “Why?” questions, or, indeed, simply of *questions*; [...] Or is he rather to be thought of as introducing a limited *capacity*, a capacity (perhaps) for being concerned about and handling just a small, potentially useful range of questions (just those which are biologically relevant)?” (CoV 83 f.)

Grice claims that the genitor has good reasons to install the unlimited capacity of rationality. But there are two problems: (a) his argument is not that strong, and, in my opinion more importantly, (b) he seems to want two different things at once: It is one thing to have a capacity for (asking or) *handling* questions and quite another to have a capacity for being *concerned* about them.

(a) In *Metaphysics and Value* Grice’s answer to the question whether the genitor is justified to install a limited or unlimited version of rationality is confined to a very general consideration of genitorial rule (G6). If a capacity is such that (i) there are stronger and weaker versions of it, and (ii) its weaker versions can only be generated by “initially building a stronger capacity and then subsequently fitting in curbs to restrict” (CoV 85) that stronger capacity, then it is more economic to install the stronger capacity.

Even if one could be convinced by this rule its applicability to the capacity ‘rationality’ remains complicated. Although in *Aspects of Reasons* Grice has tried to show that the first condition of (G6) is applicable to rationality because it is differentiated into “flat reason” and “variable reason” (AoR 20), the fulfillment of the second condition remains hairy. Grice might have thought about his additional proposal that flat reason already comprises everything required to develop any degree of variable reason so that with it the second condition of (G6) is also fulfilled. But I don’t see that.

I believe that it is more promising to argue that by (intentionally) installing all the rational capacities required for biological utile hypothetical imperatives the genitor *also* has (unintentionally) installed the rational capacities *to ask all kinds of questions*, whether they are directly or indirectly “biologically relevant”. The *capacities* (although not every manifestation of them) needed to deliver hypothetical imperatives are so complex and comprehensive that a living being who possess them can also *ask* all questions. Hence it seems to me more promising, first, to specify the rational capacities required for deliberation culminating in hypothetical imperatives (see 1.2.2) and, second, to distinguish biological utility of capacities and biological utility of their manifestations. Accordingly, the genitor may secure that the capacities are of biological utility without also securing that each of its manifestation is biologically utile.

(b) If Grice did not distinguish between the ability to *raise* and/or to *handle* questions and the ability to be *concerned* with them, he would be unable to decide the following case: Instances of a biological substance type that are endowed with rationality accidentally can raise and/or handle every kind of question but are only concerned with questions whose answers further their survival. Later in his outline in *Metaphysics and Value* Grice comes close to the required differentiation:

“Of course, to say that the creature has the capacity and the concern needed to raise, and desire answers to, *certain* [my emphasis] questions is not to say that the creature is in a position to answer those questions; indeed, we can be sure that initially he will *not* be in a position to answer those questions; since the procedures for getting answers to them have not been designed and installed in advance, and so will have to be evolved or constructed, presumably, by *Homo sapiens* himself.” (CoV 86)

Grice *not only* distinguishes between the capacity to *raise* questions and the capacity to *answer* them but also hints at a *constraint* of the set of questions that *humans ask* because they desire the answer. The only concern the genitor has installed into *humans* is their survival. Thus, if there are questions whose answers do not contribute to human survival, they do not need to be of concern for humans.

I construe Grice’s position as follows: As equipped with unlimited rationality accidentally *humans* are (i) able to raise all kinds of questions, including “Why?” questions; but (ii) as instances of one type of living beings, they are only concerned with questions, whose answers promise to enhance their chances of survival; (iii) they are able to evolve “the procedures for getting answers to” just those questions (CoV 86), i.e., they are able to acquire theoretical knowledge of the world and deliver hypothetical imperatives.

We can now understand and assess the next, decisive, move Grice makes to justify the concept of free persons.



## 2. THE TURNING POINT: WHY GO ON SURVIVING?

Grice offers two accounts of how humans generate a new substance type called *Persons*. In *Metaphysics and Value* and in *Reply to Richards* he suggests that humans perform a very special act called *Metaphysical Transubstantiation*. In *Method in Philosophical Psychology* he proposes that humans are able to raise the special question “Why go on surviving?”, whose answer requires a new attitude of humans to themselves as rational beings. The two accounts are intimately connected. By the act of *Metaphysical Transubstantiation* humans generate the new substance type; while raising that question provides the *reason* to perform such an act.

### 2.1. METAPHYSICAL TRANSUBSTANTIATION<sup>16</sup>

Here I provide a brief summary of Grice’s general idea of Metaphysical Transubstantiation:

(MT) If an entity  $\epsilon$  exhibits at  $t_1$  the essential properties of a substantial type  $S_1$  and at  $t_{n+1}$  the essential properties of a substantial type  $S_2$  without addition or subtraction of a property but only by a shift in the modal status of some or all of its properties, then an act of Metaphysical Transubstantiation (MT) has occurred (CoV 81 f.).

Applied to *humans*:

(MT<sub>h,p</sub>) If a *human*  $\epsilon$  exhibiting at  $t_1$  the essential properties of the substantial type *Homo sapiens* and the property ‘being rational’ only accidentally but exhibits at  $t_{n+1}$  the property ‘being rational’ essentially, then  $\epsilon$  falls at  $t_{n+1}$  (also)<sup>17</sup> under the substantial type *Person* and an act of MT has occurred (CoV 87, 114).

Both formulations leave it unspecified whether the shift in the modal status is something that happens to  $\epsilon$  or something that  $\epsilon$  does. But since Grice is explicit that the transubstantiation from *humans* to *persons* is something *humans* do, we can formulate (MT<sub>h,p</sub>) more precisely:

(MT<sub>h,p</sub>)\* If a *human*  $\epsilon$  exhibiting at  $t_1$  the essential properties of the substantial type *Homo sapiens* and the property ‘being rational’ only accidentally performs at  $t_{n+1}$ <sup>18</sup> an act of MT, then in the interval  $[t_{n+1}, t_{n+m+1}]$   $\epsilon$  exhibits the property ‘being rational’ essentially and falls under the substantial type *Person*.

Although Grice does not claim explicitly that this doing of *humans* is their active finality, I assume that he wanted to claim just this. Thus:

<sup>16</sup> Think of it not as an act that generates a new substance type *in nature* (“natural transubstantiation”), but as an act the product of which allows comprehending a still natural substance type in a novel way which transcends a purely naturalistic methodology. That is, of course, a Protestant interpretation of transubstantiation (17/328 f.).

<sup>17</sup> Grice leaves it open whether this addition is justified or not. From a Hegelian perspective I like that addition because it helps avoid the strict dualism between phenomenal and noumenal world.

<sup>18</sup> Grice leaves it open whether that act requires some time to be performed.



(MT<sub>hp</sub>)\*\* If a *human*  $\epsilon$  exhibiting at  $t_1$  the essential properties of the substantial type *Homo sapiens* and the property ‘being rational’ only accidentally *performs* at  $t_{n+1}$  an act of MT thereby manifesting its active finality, then during the interval  $[t_{n+1}, t_{n+m+1}]$   $\epsilon$  exhibits the property ‘being rational’ essentially and falls under the substantial type *Person*.

But why on earth should a human perform such an act?

## 2.2. WHY GO ON SURVIVING?

If we accept that the genitor is justified to endow *humans* with relatively unlimited rationality (1.2.3), we must accept that *humans* are able to ask the question “Why go on surviving?” But (a) why should they ask such a question, and (b) why and how does this question provide reasons for humans to transubstantiate themselves into *persons*? If Grice has answered these questions at all this happens in the following passage:

“In virtue of the rational capacities and dispositions which we [as philosophizing genitors; mw] have given them, [...], each of them will have both the capacity *and the desire to raise* [my emphasis] the further question ‘Why go on surviving?’; and (I hope) will be able to justify his continued existence by endorsing ... a set of criteria for evaluating and ordering ends, and applying these criteria both to ends which he may already have, as indirect aids to survival, and to ends which are yet to be selected” (CoV 144).

(a) Grice asserts that *humans* have “the desire to raise” the question “Why go on surviving?”, because of their rational capacities and/or their dispositions. Up to now, the sole end humans have is survival. If raising that question furthers this end, we can assume they have the desire to raise that question. But that does not seem the case. There seem to be only two cases. *Either* the reasons one finds for one’s continued existence *constrain* the set of situations in which one finds reasons to stay alive *or* those reasons don’t divide the set of all situations into two subsets. In the first case, to raise the question may be a reason for voluntarily ending one’s own existence in certain situations. And this obviously does not further one’s survival. In the second case, to raise the question seems superfluous and, at least *prima facie*, counterproductive to the end of survival. Most importantly, to raise and answer the question would not have any outward manifestation; hence not fulfill (G5).

Grice does not address this problem. The only way out within a mechanistic framework would differentiate between a naturally given end for *one’s own* survival and an equally given end for the survival of the *species* (e.g. the instinct to care for offspring). We can think of situations in which both ends conflict with each other so that the desire to raise that question may naturally arise. Grice bypasses the problem when he suggests that the “attribute of rationality” consists,

“in the first instance [my emphasis], of a concern on the part of the creature which has it [...] that the attitudes, positions, and acceptances which he (voluntarily) takes up should” “be well grounded, based on reasons” (CoV 82).

If that can be justified, humans as *accidentally* rational beings would have a desire (a concern), to raise that question because furthering one's survival is an attitude we *can* give up (e.g. Socrates' death). I doubt this can be justified *in a broadly mechanistic framework* grasped by the genitorial perspective, since that implies that the concern to search for reasons is *constrained* by the end of survival. Grice's project can be executed successfully only if the starting point and rationale for the act of transubstantiation are conceivable in the perspective of such a framework. Thus, I suggest that the characterization of the "attribute of rationality" applies *only* to beings that are *essentially* rational. Only if a being conceives itself as *essentially* rational it will demand reasons for *every* attitude or acceptance, whether alethic or practical, that it can voluntarily take up--independently of the question if this demand furthers the end of survival.

(b) Why and how does raising the question "Why go on surviving?" provide some reason for *humans* to transubstantiate themselves into *persons*? Grice offers no answer. With Grice's philosophy of language and with a little help of Hegel I suggest the following.

First, in *Indicative Conditionals* Grice claims that the essential function of conjunction is *not* to enable speakers "to make conjunctive statements" but to

"enable speakers to locate a plurality of conjunctive statements within the scope of a dominant negationsign; and this in turn will equip them to withhold assent from a complex of subordinate statements without committing themselves to a precise identification of each rejected component." Generally, "rational beings" "must be supposed capable of denying whatever it is they can assert." (SWW 70) <sup>19</sup>

And since this capacity is pretty basic we are justified to assume that even accidentally rational beings have it.

Second, Hegel identifies this capacity as that of *abstracting* from everything external--even from someone's bodily existence and from everything given with it (instincts, desires etc.) (Rph §5). This capacity belongs to the essence of a thinking subject ("*Geist*") and is the basis of its freedom (Enc. § 382; WdL 5/26). This necessary condition of freedom may be called 'negative freedom by thinking' or, for short, 'free thinking' (see also II).

Third, against this background the act of asking the question "Why go on surviving?" presupposes first to form a comprehensive (though internally underdetermined) concept of our given essence as one type of living beings (*humans*), and second *while* considering that question, to withhold assent or *after* reaching a result, even to deny that comprehensive concept partially or completely. To be capable of this is for Hegel our ability to liberate ourselves not only from naturally given desires but also from acquired convictions (Rph §5 Zusatz).

If these three points can be defended, we are in the position to claim that raising assiduously the question "Why go on surviving?" forces *humans* to take their rationality essentially, i.e. to transubstantiate themselves into *persons*. For on this account, the question *cannot* be answered by means

<sup>19</sup> There are other interesting points in Grice's philosophy of language that can help justify a Kantian ethics or which reconstruct parts of Hegel's *Science of Logic* (for example his thesis that rational communication is governed by a principle of cooperation (SWW 26, 341) or his version of our authority as thinkers when it comes to an interpretation of "one's own verbally formulated thoughts" (SWW 142) combined with his intersubjective theory of speaker's meaning (SWW 213 ff.; 283 ff) etc.).

end reasoning, since raising it *cancels* the *sole* end of *humans* conceived in the genitorial perspective, i.e., survival. Thus, if *humans* raise that questions and demand an answer justified by reasons, they need to make a new use of rationality. If such a new use were accompanied by a shift in modality from accidental to essential, we would have everything we need. This last step may be justified as follows. If a thinker engages in means-end reasoning to further his survival, he uses rationality only accidentally. If a thinker does not use rationality merely as means to any *given* end but uses it in such a way that he only accepts an end as worth pursuing, if he can justify it by reasons (which hold for every thinker; see CoV 144 f.), then he uses his rationality essentially. We raise the question as *humans* and have to answer it as *persons*.

And if we can justify the furthering of one's survival (and/or that of the species), the end of survival is *no longer* a *merely* naturally given end. The consideration of this purpose marks the closing stage of what can be called a practical version of the Myth of the Given which Sellars' attacked in its theoretical version.

## II. WHAT PERSONS CAN DO THAT HUMANS CANNOT

Let us assume that Grice has shown that *humans* are able to *raise* the question "Why go on surviving?" which is a *reason* to perform an act of metaphysical transubstantiation but not yet its *performance*. To this end *humans* must take their rationality essentially ceasing to be merely instances of *Homo sapiens* and becoming also instances of the substance type *Person*. Here I will only ask what *persons* can do that *humans* cannot do. Or: If the active finality of *humans* is to deliver and act according to hypothetical imperatives and to initiate acts of metaphysical transubstantiation, by what active finality are *persons* essentially characterized (see Q3 in I.1.2.1)?

I believe Grice would have answered that the essential use of rationality is not only *one* essential property but also the sole defining or constituting property of the substantial type *Persons* and its instances. Since in this case the defining property coincides with the property determining its active finality *persons* are not only *supposed* to use rationality essentially but *actually* use it in such a way. If they cease using it that way, they cease to be *persons* and become mere *humans* again.<sup>20</sup>

If this is Grice basic position we still need to identify the outward manifestations (G5) of this defining active finality thereby securing the objective reality of the concepts of *Person* and *persons* (see (Q4 in I.1.2.1)).<sup>21</sup> I address here one particular manifestation of rationality, namely, *to philosophize as free persons*.

To outline the Kantotelian connection between the concepts of being essentially rational, being free, and doing philosophy, I present first the methodological turning point reached with the concept of *human*; then I differentiate three stages of being free and use them to indicate how a philosophy executed by a methodology developed by *persons* differs from a philosophy executed by *humans*.

<sup>20</sup> If this is Grice's position, our legal capacity should not depend on *actually* being a person because then we would be capable of holding rights only in exceptional phases of our lives.

<sup>21</sup> See Grice's general proposal regarding the objective reality of psychological concepts CoV 134–138.



# 1. METHODOLOGICAL TURNING POINT: HUMANS CAN PUT THEMSELVES IN THE GENITORIAL POSITION

As we have seen humans as beings equipped with unlimited rationality accidentally are equipped (i) with every competence of alethic reason that is necessary to deliver hypothetical imperatives; (ii) with the ability to raise all kinds of questions; (iii) with a concern to raise those questions whose answer promise enhanced chance of survival; (iv) with the ability to develop procedures to answer questions; (v) with the capacity to question the biologically given end of survival by asking “Why go on surviving?” Thus they are also capable to put themselves in the genitorial position, since the genitor performs only one special type of reasoning, namely, (alethic) means-end reasoning. As Grice puts it: *Humans* “will be capable of putting themselves in the genitorial position, of asking how, if they were constructing themselves with a view to their own survival, they would execute this task; and if we have done our work aright, their answer will be the same as ours” (CoV 144).

Grice’s concept of a biological substance type whose instances are accidentally rational justifies the preliminary introduction of the required methodological perspective for a Metaphysic of Biology, namely, the genitorial perspective.<sup>22</sup> Since this may appear as a miracle worthy of the Baron of Münchhausen, Grice has labeled it “Bootstrap”<sup>23</sup> (CoV 103). If bootstrapping were impossible, not only Grice’s but also Hegel’s project would be doomed to failure (WdL 6/567). Thus, let us assume that by reaching the concept of *Homo sapiens* Grice has justified, backwardly, the introduction of the genitorial perspective needed to execute his Metaphysics of Biology (and his philosophical psychology).

Yet, the methodological means for a general ontology and a special metaphysics of inanimate nature are either unspecified in Grice’s metaphysics or confined to the genitorial perspective (with some unfortunate consequences similar to the Christian attitude to “sub-human” nature). To avoid these consequences and to specify the means necessary to execute those other metaphysical disciplines and the succeeding Metaphysics of Persons and Morals, Grice needs, I believe, a richer idea of philosophical methodology beyond the genitorial perspective. Grice can, in principle, deliver such a methodology only because his metaphysics does not end with the concept of *Homo sapiens*.<sup>24</sup> Unfortunately, he leaves it to his readers to develop such a methodology.

So, like Hegel, Grice needs a threefold methodology: 1. Grice’s genitorial perspective can be reconstructed in Hegel’s terms as a perspective which is adopted through the attitude comprehended in the Idea of Cognition (“Verstand”). 2. His turning point can be understood as the most momentous intervention of the second side of Hegel’s method, the sceptic. 3. His concept of a free person is, at the least, the necessary starting point for developing and executing a methodology of speculative reason (Enc. §§ 79 – 82).

<sup>22</sup> See Chapman 174: “that any ideas or entities used in the meta-system should later be introduced formally in the system”.

<sup>23</sup> In spite of this witty origin of the literal meaning of bootstrapping, bootstrap principles have flourished in statistics, linguistics, physics, and law.

<sup>24</sup> In *Actions and Events* Grice wants to show that the standard framework of analytic action theory (developed prominently by Donald Davidson) can only grasp our competences of acting according to hypothetical imperatives. And since for him rationality transgresses that boundary, Grice puts himself into the tradition of Kantotle.



## 2. RATIONALITY, FREEDOM, AND PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD

### 2.1. FREE THINKING AND PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD

I have suggested that being essentially rational means for Grice that we have to justify every attitude we can voluntarily take up with reasons (CoV 82). Marina Sbisà calls this kind of rationality “argumentative rationality” and connects it with Grice’s thesis that persons have absolute value:

“[t]he conception of rationality that emerges from Grice (1991; 2001) can be summarized as follows: rationality is a concern that one’s moves are justified and a capacity (to some degree) to give effect to that concern. [...] I believe that this conception of rationality merits to be called “argumentative”. [...] Persons have absolute value just because they possess argumentative rationality essentially.” (Sbisà 2003)

I agree that for Grice being essentially rational means to possess “argumentative rationality.” Yet, Sbisà does not clarify why such a rational being is therefore also free (CoV 87). To make some of the reasons of this additional thesis explicit I have outlined an argument (I.2.2) for the claim that the capability to ask the question “Why go on surviving?” presupposes<sup>25</sup> the competence of a thinking subject to dissociate itself, at least transiently, from assenting to any given thought content whatsoever, so that the thinker can scrutinize the contents by reason. If a person actualizes this competence he *liberates* himself, at least transiently, from the causal powers connected with scrutinized desires or intentions to act according to them. If a person *gives up* some of his intentions by using his argumentative rationality or *withdraws* his affirmation to acts prompted by certain desires, he may be able to liberate himself continuously from every actualization of those causal powers.

To make this connection of argumentative rationality and freedom explicit I call -with Hegel- this essential use of rationality free thinking (Hegel: *Werke*, Vol. 20, p. 120). Although there is much left to be done to fully develop a convincing and comprehensive theory of free thinking<sup>26</sup>, I believe Grice would have been in favor of such a theory (cited above, AaE, 3).

The most obvious consequence for a philosophical methodology designed and executed by *persons* (beings capable of free thinking) instead of *humans*, is the following: Whereas *humans*, thinking in the genitorial perspective, are confined to theoretical knowledge of the world to discern means to the end of survival, a *person* doing philosophy is neither confined to think about the actual world nor to means-end reasoning nor committed to the end of survival as the sole end. A person can demand justification for *every* attitude independently of there being any end that is furthered by such an inquiry. This point already

<sup>25</sup> “Freedom, which in turn is a precondition of any exercise of rationality whatsoever” (CoV 105).

<sup>26</sup> In I.2.2. I have introduced a necessary linguistic condition of free thinking. Another condition is that although the most primitive signs by which *humans* have communicated their thoughts were causally determined by the signified entities, *humans* have somehow developed step by step “communication vehicles” that have no causal relation to the thought entities. In Grice words: “Any link [between the vehicles used and the intended meaning, mw] will do, provided it is detectable by the receiver, and the looser the links creatures are in a position to use, the greater the *freedom* [my emphasis] they will have as communicators, since they will be less and less restricted by the need to rely on prior natural connections. The widest possible range is given where creatures use for these purposes a range of communication devices which have no antecedent connections at all with the things that they communicate or represent” (SWW 295 f.) See Hegel’s astonishingly similar considerations in Enc. § 458, 46–464.

secures that *to philosophize is the most comprehensive rational exercise we are capable of* and, therefore, *to philosophize is at least one of the most prominent manifestations of using our rationality*. This is one of the reasons why Hegel's philosophy culminates in a conception of philosophy.

## 2.2. FREE WILLING AND FREE ACTING

I do not believe that the competence of *free thinking* is sufficient to call a being essentially rational. There are two cases for a possible breakdown of rationality, even if a being thinks freely. Since Grice is not very explicit about this<sup>27</sup>, I shall develop the basic idea with the help of the philosopher I like to dub "Grice".

To illustrate the *first* deficit, consider the case of somebody holding the reasonable conviction that following a certain maxim is the best available option for a rational being living in conditions C. If this conviction has no effect on his will to act according to that maxim, we would not call such a person reasonable. What is needed is the additional capacity to determine the will *according* the insight of what one should do. This capacity might be called "*free willing*".

But even if a living being is equipped not only with the capacity of free thinking but also of free willing there is still a possible breakdown of rationality. To illustrate this *second* deficit consider the case of somebody who has the intention to act according to his legitimate wishes or duties but is not able to perform the required action *without external hindrances*. In such cases we would not call the agent reasonable. What is needed is the capacity of our will to *determine* and to *initiate*, at least partially and maybe indirectly, the act called for by reason(s). This capacity may be called "*free acting*". Only if all three moments are manifested, the reasons justifying the thinker's actions are at the same time also *explanatory reasons* (AoR 41). For, only then his deliberation has an outwardly observable manifestation (G 5). (Rph §120)

As we have seen as genitors *humans* are not supposed to act according to a will. The genitorial perspective is only a heuristic device that helps to conceive a developing series of types of living beings culminating in the concept of *Homo sapiens*. Hence, of course, by executing the genitorial program *humans* generate only a *concept* of themselves--their existence and essence being naturally given. This is not the case for *persons*. By *performing* acts of metaphysical transubstantiation persons do not form the *concept* of a new substance type and its instances. They *generate* that type and its instances --thereby securing that the concepts still to be developed are not empty. Though persons may not be causes of themselves with regard to existence in time and space, they are causes of their essence. This is Grice's version of Kant's "fact of reason" and of the methodological role of our subjective cognition in Hegel's philosophy; (Enc. §576). Only *after* generating themselves as essentially rational and free persons, can they undertake the project of composing a metaphysical story and thereby gaining a concept of themselves. For very similar reasons Hegel claims that the *dictum* of the Oracle of Delphi "know thyself"

<sup>27</sup> See his general remark about a common flaw of Aristotle and Kant that makes clear that Grice did not remain at the competence of free thinking: "It is curious that both Aristotle and Kant [...] should have succumbed to the fascination of the purely intellectual being. Both of them, it seems to me, at crucial moments thought of rationality, the realization of which must be the supreme end of a rational being, as being the *distinctive element* in such a being, considered in isolation from other elements necessarily present in [...] such a being." I believe that Hegel shared Grice's irritation.

is the highest precept for a thinking subject (Enc. § 377). Thus, to form a will and to perform the corresponding act of metaphysical transubstantiation are necessary and sufficient for the *generation* of essentially rational and free beings. Yet, they are neither sufficient for nor part of a development of a conception of free persons. To develop such a conception, persons need *only* use their *alethic reason* essentially, that is, to actualize their competence of *free thinking*.

That's why doing philosophy is *not* the only answer to the question: To what actions are essentially rational and free beings committed? As endowed with the competence of free thinking, free willing, and free acting they are *supposed to act according to categorical imperatives*. To spell out the meaning of this crucial thesis, I have to wait for another occasion. For the moment, I shall be content in case I could show that Hegel's philosophy is still alive since at least one contemporary philosopher has asked the very same questions and delivered some astonishingly similar answers.

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Resumo: O principal objetivo filosófico de Grice e Hegel é desenvolver uma ideia de liberdade de tal maneira que possa ser solucionado ou dissolvido "o mais importante problema não resolvido na filosofia, a saber, de como nós podemos ser ao mesmo tempo membros do mundo fenomênico e do mundo noumenal" (Grice, *Action and Events* 35). A presente autora se concentrará nesse artigo no programa metafísico de Grice, porque ele é menos conhecido que a filosofia da linguagem de Grice e menos conhecido que a filosofia de Hegel. Em primeiro lugar, a autora reconstruirá criticamente a parte do programa metafísico de Grice em que ele defende que as instâncias da



substância biológica do tipo *Homo Sapiens* se encontram providas com os meios necessários para transubstancializar a eles mesmos ao gerar uma nova espécie de substância denominada *persona*. Uma vez que esse tipo não é concebível em termos meramente mecanicistas ou biológico-mecanicistas, torna-se necessário uma ampliação do quadro conceitual para que ele também contenha conceitos práticos (“valor absoluto”, “liberdade”). Além disso, a autora investigará o status metodológico específico do conceito de pessoa na metafísica de Grice. Aqui os programas de Grice e Hegel coincidem com a filosofia de Kant, o que torna a ambos kantotéticos. Por fim, o autor esboçará dois importantes pontos do papel metodológico do conceito de liberdade para a realização de um programa kantotético completo.

Palavras-Chave: Grice, Hegel, Metafísica, Liberdade, Naturalismo.

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